Triggerfinger

Footnote 2

2 Admittedly, in Taylor v. F.D.I.C., 132 F.3d 753, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we observed that the causation requirement of standing could coincide with the causal element in a cause of action. But cf. id. at 770 (Rogers, J., concurring). Whether that was correct or not, we concluded that even in that unique situation, not present here, we had discretion to decide the case on the merits or on standing grounds. Id. at 767-68.

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