Triggerfinger

Decision of the DC Superior Court in DC v Beretta U.S.A Corp.

The decision (101 pages) of the DC Superior Court dismissing the city's lawsuit in DC v Beretta U.S.A. Corp.  The lawsuit springs from laws explicitly passed by DC's legislature to enable them.  When discussing firearms in DC, it's important to understand the background: DC bans all handguns owned by private citizens (it's still possible for security guards to possess them, if licensed, but they may not be stored in the home).  Pretty much any semi-automatic, magazine-fed firearm is banned.  Remaining firearms (shotguns and bolt-action hunting rifles) are licensed and registered according to onerous procedures.

With that in mind, it's laughable for the District to pass laws imposing strict liability on manufacturers of legal products outside of their jurisdiction when the manufacture, sale, and possession of those products is forbidden within the District's jurisdiction.  The vast majority of those possessing a firearm in the District of Columbia are doing so illegally.  The District compounds their hubris by filing suit with plaintiffs who do not even know which manufacturer produced the product with which they were shot.  They were shot with a "firearm" and that's enough to sue everyone who manufactures a "firearm".  Insane.

The District is a party to the suit and wants financial compensation and injunctive relief -- that is, they want to be able to dictate policy to the manufacturers as a result of this lawsuit.  The individual plaintiffs want money.  The case came before Judge Long (Civil Action 0428-00), and his decision was issued in response to a Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings.  For clarity, this decision does not represent the final outcome of the case; I'm including it here for background purposes.

The defendents in this case consist of a laundry list of firearms manufacturers, both US and foreign:
  1. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
  2. B.L. Jennings, Inc
  3. Browning Arms Company
  4. Bryco Arms, Inc
  5. Carl Walther GMBH
  6. Century International Arms, Inc
  7. Colt's Manufacturing Co., Inc
  8. Davis Industries, Inc
  9. Forjas Taurus, S.A.
  10. Glock, Inc
  11. Glock GMBH
  12. H&R 1871
  13. Heckler & Koch, Inc
  14. Heckler & Koch, GMBH
  15. Hi-Point Firearms
  16. K.B.I. Inc
  17. International Armament Corp.
  18. Navegar, Inc
  19. Norinco Sports, U.S.A. Inc.
  20. Phoenix Arms, Inc.
  21. Pietro Beretta SP.A.
  22. Sigarms, Inc
  23. Smith & Wesson Corp.
  24. Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc
  25. Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc.
  26. DOES 1-100
That last line means, in essence, that the District expects to discover the identity of additional defendents during the course of the case and add them as defendents as it does so.

The Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings is held to the same standard as a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which belief can be granted; it's a very high standard to meet, and (if successful) cuts the trial short without proceeding any further into the case (eg, no argument or evidence on the merits of case).  The motion must succeed or fail based on the contents of the plaintiff's pleadings, which are assumed to be true for the purposes of the motion.  I won't keep you in suspense; here's the most important paragraph of the ruling:
Based upon the following analysis of relevant case law and bedrock legal principles, this Court concludes that the arguments of the defendants are compelling as to the entry of judgment in their favor. The plaintiffs? myriad claims herein are burdened with many layers of legal deficiencies. The defendants are entitled to judgments in their favor even if every allegation in the Complaint is true.
In other words, there's no question of fact which would require a trial to determine; even if the plaintiffs' allegations are true, there is no justification for relief.  They are, in short, out of luck -- at least before this judge.  That's a clear win for our side, resulting in a dismissal of the case at this level.  (Inevitably, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal; more on that later).

It's worth noting here that the model for this lawsuit was the various state-level tobacco lawsuits, which were successful beyond the wildest dreams of the plaintiffs.  Those lawsuits in effect sought huge monetary damages from extremely well-off tobacco companies as "compensation" for the "public health effects" of smoking.  The claim was that the tobacco companies had concealed the health risks of their products with false and misleading advertising and otherwise knowingly sold products with negative health consequences to supposedly unsuspecting consumers (and never mind that the government had ordered that tobacco products have warning labels). 

The claim was bolstered by insider testimony from industry executives, and the intent was to force the industry to settle the lawsuits rather than risk huge judgements that would bankrupt them.  Overall, the tactic was successful; the industry preferred to settle and continue in business than risk a dramatic loss.  With non-durable, addictive products, they could afford to raise prices in order to recover the amount of their settlement. 

But the basic idea was to win huge monetary awards for the state governments in conjunction with conduct restrictions that would not pass a state legislature.  That's the same strategy that is evident here, but there are some differences. 

First, the firearms industry is not wealthy; the products are durable, low-margin, simple to manufacture, and already broadly available.  The firearms industry does not have the money for huge payoffs. 

Second, the tobacco companies have a product which has health risks associated with its normal and proper use; firearms are generally very safe for the person using them.  The majority of firearms injuries are the result of criminal intent, suicide, or negligence, although there are of course genuine defective-product claims which have been adjudicated normally. 

Third, the tobacco industry faced allegations of actual wrongdoing supported by evidence from turncoat executives.  The firearms industry is heavily regulated and generally makes a substantial effort to remain within the law.  The testimony of Robert Ricker, ex-firearms-industry-lobbyist, is insufficient to be analogous; the worst he can allege is that the industry did not go above and beyond the strict requirements of the law. 

Fourth, all named plaintiffs in this case suffered their firearm injuries in the course of a crime.  One set of plaintiffs was shot in the course of a robbery, and another set were killed or injured in a gang shooting.  That intervening criminal act normally places all liability on the criminal.

As a result of those differences, in order to make this claim credible at all, the District passed a law imposing strict liability on the firearms industry.  Without such a law this lawsuit would be laughed out of court.

Here's the relevant law, the Assualt Weapons Strict Liability Act of 1990:
Any manufacturer, importer, or dealer of an assault weapon or machine gun shall be held strictly liable in tort, without regard to fault or proof of defect, for all direct and consequential damages that arise from bodily injury or death if the bodily injury or death proximately results from the discharge of the assault weapon or machine gun in the District of Columbia.
Since this is the District of Columbia, remember that a "machine gun" is defined as a semi-automatic firearm that can fire more than 12 shots without reloading.  Since almost all semiautomatic firearms can accept magazines holding more than 12 rounds, just about any semiautomatic firearm will trigger this law.  The law's definition of an assault weapon enumerates specific weapons by their trade names (eg, the "Street Sweeper"). 

Here's the claim for damages:
Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff District for (1) health care costs and Medicaid expenses the District has incurred for care and treatments of victims of this gun violence and (2) costs of other assistance and compensation provided or paid by the District to police officers, firefighters, and other District employees who have suffered injuries from this gun violence, which costs are recoverable under District statutes. D.C. Code §§ 1-624.31, 3-502, and 4-502. Defendants also are liable for any other costs incurred by the District that are recoverable by statute, in equity, or under common law.
Given the level of gun violence in the District, that's pretty much a blank check.  It is not limited to the specific plaintiffs in the case.

In order to try to link the defendents to the victims, the District describes how the firearms enter the District (where, as you will recall, the possession, manufacture, and sale are strictly regulated and in many cases banned entirely).  They cite the usual boogeymen; straw purchases, "unlicensed dealers", gun shows, and stolen firearms.  The possible remedies that the District alleges could have been used by the manufacturers to reduce their liability include a wish list of gun control policies; everything from "one handgun a month" to tracking individual sales.

So what are the arguments that won the day?
  1. Count I (strict liability)
    1. Deficencies in the complaint under the AW Strict Liability Act.
    2. The Assault Weapon Strict Liability Act is unconstitutional, as it seeks to regulate interstate commerce.
  2. Count II (negligent distribution)
    1. No common law duty has been breached.
    2. The claims are too remote to establish proximate cause.
  3. Count III (public nuisance)
    1. Public nuisance claims normally rest upon land bearing such a public nuisance, which in this case does not exist.
    2. No statute exists permitting such a lawsuit.
    3. Common-law public nuisance claims do not cover the circumstances of this case.
  4. Count IV (subrogated individual claims)
    1. District failed to plead specific cases as required by law; there is no right to aggregate claims.
  5. Count V (reimbursement for cost of public services)
    1. Case law explicitly precludes the District from seeking money damages to reimburse it for the cost of public safety services ("professional rescuers doctrine").
    2. Collective liability and market share calculations as a basis for damages is invalid.
There's too much additional material to cover in a single post.  Additional posts with the details of each count will follow.

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